Bush’s Big Mistake
When all is said and done, George Bush could be right about Iraq. There has never been any credible defense of the hateful regime, and there is plenty of reason to believe Saddam is doing his level best to deceive and divide international opinion as he has done so successfully in the past, even while offering tokens of compliance. The term “regime change” in reference to Iraq entered the American political vocabulary from the mouth of Bill Clinton, not Bush, and I often ask myself how my reaction to the present situation would differ if Clinton or Gore were in the White House pursuing basically the same policy (as likely they would).
So this begs the important question – if Bush is right about Iraq, wherein lies the problem? Seems to me that there are three areas that galvanize opposition.
- Supporting Bush on the war strengthens his political position to achieve other outcomes. This is where most partisans on both sides fall, and if you’re a partisan yourself, there’s no further need for discussion. That said, it doesn’t address the issue on the merits, and it presumes the agreement of whoever you’re talking to.
- It’s not the policy, it’s the way it’s being executed. This argument comes down to competence rather than ideology, and it is the fundamental subtext for everyone who questions the war on the basis of timing, priorities, our ability to successfully manage a post-war Iraq, the potential of future terrorism as a result of these actions, our inability to form a broad coalition, our ability to pay for the war given the other economic problems, and the general low level of confidence that the Bush team has inspired in other areas. It must be said that the jury is still out on all of these questions, and Bush and co. might possibly prove all their critics wrong in the end if it all works out.
- It sets a horrible precedent. Yes, Saddam is a bad guy and the regime is probably guilty of something, but we can’t just go and topple a government anytime we feel like it.
In the long run, it’s number 3 that is probably the most problematic for Bush at home and abroad, and it’s a problem strictly of his own making. The case against Iraq in particular is much stronger than the case for pre-emptive action in general. Where Clinton and Gore would likely have differed from the Bush approach is in separating Iraq from the larger doctrinal question, so that potential allies would feel less anxiety about signing a “blank check” for future American (or Russian, or Chinese) ambitions that would rely on the precedent of pre-emptive war. Instead, Bush and his team have not only consistently failed to give assurances about their longer term intentions, but have given voice to the most extreme positions within the Republican party who would like to use the whole crisis situation as a springboard for a totally interest-driven, unilateralist foreign policy.
This absolutist approach, so typical of the temperament and methods of the Administration, has scared the bejeezus out of most of the world and many of the more thoughtful people here at home. In the minds of many, the drawbacks of signing up for the Wolfowitz-Cheney world domination plan outweigh the considerable merits of any action against Saddam. The Administration has been so strident in its rhetoric for so long that it is now almost impossible to separate the two issues, and the suspicions raised about American intentions in the long run will be hard to dispel.
It didn’t need to be this way. Bush made the choice to frame the Iraq issue as part of a grander doctrine, within the context of an alarming shift in the way the US deals with the rest of the world. If he hadn’t been so insistent on shoving the notion of American supremacy down the throats of an international and domestic audience clearly uncomfortable with that proposition, he could have had his war and his alliance and eaten it too. As it is, the inevitable conflict and military victory will be hollowed out by this President’s one really big mistake.
2:04:18 PM 
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