An Inevitable Surprise
One of my primary frustrations with the Bush foreign policy is that, almost from the very beginning, their true motives and objectives were buried under a thick coat of deception and double-talk. It was impossible to discuss something like the invasion of Iraq on the merits because all we got from the Administration was a drumbeat of lies about WMDs and transparently-false allegations of terrorist connections to Al Qaeda, sprinkled with some highly-selective outrage over Saddam’s bestial regime. In posts leading up to the war in 2002 and 2003, I struggled with this problem of trying to suss out the underlying rationale: was it economic, geopolitical, oil-related? It was, and remains, inconceivable to me that America would pursue the course that it has since 9/11 without at least some kind of a guiding framework with some connection to reality, even if that framework were rooted in principles that were too venal and self-interested to discuss publicly.
To the extent that neo-cons have articulated their aims clearly, in things like the PNAC manifesto, it is possible to gain some insights into the ideology that many see as motivating our actions since 2001. However, what troubles me about neo-con ideology in foreign affairs isn’t necessarily their objectives so much as their shockingly naïve and unrealistic view of the world. If they really believe in empire and the imposition of democracy by force – an arguable policy at best – they will never get there based on the poor grasp of basic international relations and faulty reasoning displayed in their writings and candid public utterances. Foreign policy experts left, right and center, from Madeline Albright and Zbigniew Brzezinski to Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, have strongly challenged the neo-con model not out of disagreement with its ultimate goals of American aggrandizement (which all but the Chomsky-Left and Buchanan-Right share), but on the basis of its erroneous assumptions and proven inability to deliver on its promises.
In short, the lack of coherence and policy rigor inherent in the neo-con worldview seemed destined to doom it to failure, or at least make it considerably more difficult to execute than any of its proponents believed. Events have shown this to be largely true. At the same time, though they are wrong abut a lot, they are not wrong about everything, and there is virtue in their objective of promoting stability in the most chaotic regions of the world through democratization. That said, it remains baffling why, if Bush sincerely believes in the principles of neo-conservatism, he has not executed the vision with more competence, or made more than the weakest efforts to extend American leadership in dimensions other than pure military force.
Like most who disagree with the Bush Administration on these matters, I attribute these failings to Bush’s basic weakness as a man and a leader. He is simply too narrow-minded, stubborn and insecure to venture far from the certainties of his ideology and temperament, even if a show of diplomacy will help him achieve his long-term objectives more readily than petulance and swagger. He’s also too much in the grip of short-term political thinking, and the need to satisfy the unsophisticated extremist base of the GOP, to venture too far afield even as a tactical matter.
Because this simple explanation fits the facts and is supported by ample evidence, I am inclined to agree with it, but I remain willing to consider other arguments if they are convincing. And as it happens, in the course of doing some research for a work-related project, I stumbled across what must be the most coherent, reasonable and persuasive rationale for both neo-conservative goals and Bush’s heavy-handed tactics that I have heard from any quarter.
The source is a book called Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulance, by Peter Schwartz. Schwartz is a renowned futurist: founder of the consulting firm Global Business Network, author of The Art of the Long View (which expounds on GBN’s methodology of scenario-planning), advisor to the Hart-Rudman Terrorism Panel which, in the spring of 2001, released a report that described the possibility of terrorists flying hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center, and all-around smart guy. I heard him present last fall at the GBN Summit, where he articulately defended his optimistic view of the future against a very skeptical and well-informed audience.
Anyway, in Inevitable Surprises, which was published in 2003 around the time of the Iraq invasion, Schwartz places Bush’s unwillingness to engage with international institutions in the context of political, economic, historical and demographic trends in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. He points out that the Clinton administration was making similar efforts to unwind from Cold War multilateralism – efforts that were much more sub-rosa because Clinton talked the talk and appeared slightly less venal in his pursuit of American interests, but nonetheless shared many of the same assumptions and objectives of the neo-cons. He strikingly suggests that a President Gore may have been put in the same situation with respect to Iraq, and been forced to pursue much the same course as Bush, right down to the failure to be candid with the American people and the international community as to the true objectives. Schwartz is even able to convincingly explain Star Wars (SDI) and how what seems to be an antedated relic of the Cold War era actually fits into a 21st century defense doctrine that is in fact shared by a broad consensus of Congressional Democrats as well as Republicans.
His points about the economic, political and demographic fate of Europe are especially interesting to those of us on the moderate Left who view the EU as having gotten it right in terms of diplomatic, economic, environmental and lifestyle issues. While not disagreeing with that, Schwartz points out what it means to have, for the first time in recorded history, an entire European continent that is irrelevant militarily.
Schwartz does not seem to be a partisan, and his analysis is almost entirely free of contentious, politically-provocative language. It’s written in the reasoned style of a Bay Area cosmopolitan (which he is), without the PC biases and annoying finger-wagging of many liberals on this subject.
Agree with his conclusions or not, Schwartz and his perspective are worth considering. And it would be nice if he were right, because the picture he paints is a long-ways more hopeful than anything I would bet on.
(Note: There should really be more links in this post, but I don’t have time. Google the items that interest you, as there is plenty more on this subject on the Web)
8:50:30 AM 
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