The War Against Intelligence
Today’s Wall Street Journal features an impassioned editorial titled “Stupid Intelligence,” which asserts that the Plame affair is a symptom of a greater hostility between the intelligence community (primarily the CIA) and the Administration, fostered by the CIA’s squeamish reluctance to confront the reality of global terrorism with the force and vigor required to defeat it. The article opines:
They continue to view terrorism as a containable and endurable problem to be fought primarily in the courts after the fact and through cooperation with friendly intelligence agencies. Since preventive military action might jeopardize international cooperation, they see it as something to be avoided at all costs.
Following the “slime and defend” playbook, the writer goes on to impugn Larry Johnson, the self-identified conservative Republican retired CIA operative, as the false prophet of a declining trend in world terrorism, having authored over-optimistic assessments of the weakness of Osama Bin Laden’s network in the months prior to 9/11 – months, it will be remembered, when Bush was clearing brush on his ranch in Crawford and Condi Rice was poo-poohing alarming reports from FBI agents suggesting that someone was planning to “fly planes into towers.” 9/11 turned a lot of people’s assumptions upside down. Larry Johnson was not the only one.
The more serious charge is that the CIA is failing in its mission to provide operational support for the policy of the Administration. “The larger point here is that intelligence is supposed to be a tool for elected policy makers, not a restraint on their action,” says the Journal. Decisions about action should be taken by elected leaders, not career bureaucrats pursuing their own agendas.
That’s a good point as far as it goes. But the existence of the CIA has a role and a purpose in the national security system of the United States. It is meant to provide basic facts to ground policy discussions, and methodical analysis as a framework for predicting outcomes. If policy-makers are prepared to act on ideological grounds that have no reference to real-world conditions and are unmindful of real-world consequences, then resources like the CIA are simply a waste of money and should be disbanded.
The CIA doesn’t always get it right, and sometimes it takes its time coming to conclusions. But, especially in the example of Iraq, it proves the saying that wheels that grind slow often grind fine. CIA skepticism about Iraqi weapons programs was correct, while the Administration’s politically-motivated assessments are exposed as more and more flawed by the day. CIA questions about post-war conditions in Iraq have, regrettably, proven more accurate in their pessimism than the ideologue’s rosy predictions of sunshine and happiness.
The issue still on the table with respect to Iraq is the disposition of the post-war Iraqi government. The CIA is known to have deep reservations about Ahmed Chalabi, the smooth-talking expatriate “businessman” who enjoys the favor of the NeoCons and has wormed his way in to an influential post in the transitional government, despite zero support and visibility with the Iraqi people in whose name this entire enterprise was supposedly mounted.
There are many in the PNAC gallery who will not consider the Iraq adventure a success unless Chalabi emerges as the new head of state. You can bet that the WSJ Editorial Page, with close ties to this crowd, is not taking on the Agency only as part of a knee-jerk response to the Plame case, but has its eye on the coming fights when the credibility of both sides will be put to the test.
8:53:34 AM 
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